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PETITIONER ESTOPPEL FROM
PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SAS INSTITUTE
INC. V. IANCU
JENNIFER ESCH, PAULA MILLER, STACY LEWIS, & TOM IRVING*
ABSTRACT
The Federal Circuit decision in Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v.
Automated Creel Systems, Inc. addressing petitioner estoppel from Patent
Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) decisions has not been uniformly
interpreted by district courts or the PTAB. The Supreme Court’s recent SAS
Institute Inc. v. Iancu decision, which requires institution or rejection on all
petitioned claims, moots disagreements among jurisdictions regarding
estoppel of petitioned, non-instituted grounds because the Federal Circuit
and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) have
interpreted SAS to preclude institution on less than all grounds in a petition.
Yet, district courts’ conflicting interpretations of Shaw to date demonstrate
some remnant uncertainty for petitioner estoppel for at least two issues:
(1) Whether non-petitioned claims and grounds later raised in the
district court necessarily constitute arguments that “reasonably could have
[been] raised during [the previous] inter partes review.”1
(2) Whether petitioned grounds, where the final written decision was
based on only a subset of grounds and the decision is subsequently
overturned in favor of the patent owner, remain subject to petitioner
estoppel.

* Jennifer Esch is a 2L at Harvard Law School and was a 2018 Summer Associate in the Boston office
of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner LLP. Paula Miller is an associate, Stacy Lewis is a
law clerk, and Tom Irving is a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Finnegan, Henderson,
Farabow, Garrett & Dunner LLP.
1. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012).
10
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I. INTRODUCTION
This year, the Supreme Court clarified the discretion afforded to the
PTAB in inter partes reviews (“IPRs”).2 SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu
restricted the PTAB’s discretion to pick which challenged claims of a
patent it reviews when initiating an America Invents Act (“AIA”)
proceeding.3 Now, when deciding to institute a review, the PTAB cannot
pick a subset of challenged claims to review.4 Instead, the PTAB must
either decide to review all of the challenged claims or decline review.5
Although SAS did not decide whether the PTAB must address all grounds
(as opposed to claims) raised in a petition for IPR, subsequent guidance
from the PTAB makes clear that the PTAB will no longer opt for a subset
of grounds for institution.6 The PTAB’s current policy to institute all
petitioned grounds, as well as all petitioned claims, has been reaffirmed by
the appellate court as an appropriate approach.7 This change should broadly
affect PTAB proceedings and parallel district court litigation.8
SAS also affects the petitioner’s estoppel provision of the IPR statute,
35 U.S.C. § 315(e). This provision bars a petitioner who has received a
final written decision (“FWD”) in an IPR from raising or asserting in a later
litigation or patent review any ground of patentability of a claim that the
petitioner “raised or reasonably could have raised during [the earlier] inter
partes review.”9 The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of this provision in
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu,138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358–59 (2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA trial proceedings, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. (Apr.
26,
2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appealboard/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial (last visited Oct. 14, 2018) [hereinafter “April 26
Guidance”](“As required by the decision, the PTAB will institute as to all claims or none. At this time,
if the PTAB institutes a trial, the PTAB will institute on all challenges raised in the petition.”).
7. PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We will treat
claims and grounds the same in considering the SAS issues currently before us. In light of SAS, the
USPTO issued a ‘“Guidance’” declaring that the Board will now institute on all claims and all grounds
included in a petition if it institutes at all . . . We read [the SAS opinion] as interpreting the statute to
require a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in
the petition, and we have seen no basis for a contrary understanding of the statute in light of SAS.”)
(citing April 26 Guidance, supra note 6); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry, 891 F.3d 1368, 1371 n.1
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting that, following the SAS decision and the PTAB guidance, the PTAB will
address every ground, in addition to every claim, raised in the petition on remand, and taking no issue
with that approach).
8. See, e.g., Stephen Schreiner & Maxine Graham, PTAB Institution Decisions in the Wake of
SAS, LAW360 (July 12, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1062336/ptab-institution-decisions-inthe-wake-of-sas; Matthew Bultman, Tough Questions Await as PTAB Partial Reviews Get Boot,
LAW360 (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1037002.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012). 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) covers proceedings before the PTAB while
35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) covers proceedings in federal courts and before the ITC.
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Shaw10 has been inconsistently interpreted by various district courts and the
PTAB.11 SAS and subsequent PTAB guidance may moot past court splits
on estoppel from non-instituted claims and grounds—since any IPR
reaching a FWD will see all petitioned claims and grounds instituted and
addressed. However, uncertainty remains for (1) non-petitioned claims and
grounds and (2) petitioned grounds where the FWD had addressed only a
subset of grounds (e.g., instituted prior to SAS or where parties have
stipulated to dropping certain grounds) and the decision is subsequently
overturned in favor of the patent owner. This article will outline this
remaining uncertainty and suggest ways to mitigate it.
II. JURISDICTIONAL SPLIT IN THE APPLICATION OF ESTOPPEL
In Shaw, the Federal Circuit held that the “plain language” of § 315(e)
prohibits the application of estoppel to grounds that were included in an
IPR petition (“petitioned grounds”) but not instituted, reasoning that an
“IPR does not begin until it is instituted,” and thus grounds not instituted
were not raised, and could not reasonably have been raised, during the IPR
proper.12
Thus, after Shaw many district courts declined to apply § 315(e)
estoppel to petitioned but denied grounds, regardless of the reason
institution was denied.13 However, at least one district court, the Eastern
District of Texas, estopped an accused infringer from asserting petitioned,
non-instituted grounds as later district court invalidity defenses, where such
grounds had been rejected by the PTAB on their merits.14 This court held
that non-instituted grounds were only protected from estoppel under Shaw
when institution was denied for procedural reasons.15 Thus, district courts
10. Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
11. See Linda A. Wadler, Barbara R. Rudolph & Meredith H. Boerschlein, IPR Estoppel: Current
District Court Trends and Practice Tips, 30 No. 1 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3 (2018) (discussing the
interpretation of Shaw by district courts and the PTAB and making practice recommendations prior to
the SAS decision); Steven J. Schwarz, Tamatane J. Aga, Kristin M. Adams & Katherine C. Dearing,
Savvy Shaw-ping: A Strategic Approach to AIA Estoppel, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 67 (2018)
(also discussing the interpretation of Shaw by district courts and the PTAB and making practice
recommendations prior to the SAS decision); Andrew Moshirnia, I Fought the Shaw: A Game Theory
Framework and Approach to the District Courts’ Struggle with IPR Estoppel, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL.
PROP. 411 (2018) (discussing the interpretation of Shaw by district courts and the PTAB and suggesting
hypothetical trends to test).
12. Shaw Indus. Grp., 817 F.3d at 1300.
13. See, e.g., Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1028–29 (E.D.
Wis. 2017) (discussing holdings from different district courts regarding the application of estoppel to
non-instituted grounds); see also Moshirnia, supra note 12, at 417.
14. Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2-13-cv-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 2526231, at *7 (E.D.
Tex. May 11, 2017).
15. Id.
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disagreed on the meaning of Shaw, and the state of estoppel, for petitioned
but non-instituted claims and grounds.
That conflict is now moot. SAS eliminated the possibility of
proceedings and a FWD on only some of the petitioned claims. Following
SAS, PTAB policy, affirmed by the Federal Circuit, has eliminated the
possibility of proceedings and FWD on a subset of petitioned grounds.16
And even standing alone, SAS may contribute to resolving significant
jurisdictional disagreements regarding the application of estoppel to nonpetitioned grounds. While district courts and the PTAB had in the past split
as to how to interpret Shaw regarding non-petitioned grounds, a recent
district court opinion from the District of Massachusetts concluded that
SAS implied that “reasonably could have [been] raised” would have to refer
to non-petitioned grounds, as otherwise, the words “reasonably could have
[been] raised” would have no meaning.17
A. Cases finding no estoppel to non-petitioned grounds
Before SAS several district courts, including the District of Delaware,
the District of Massachusetts, and the Northern District of California, read
Shaw as narrowly circumscribing petitioner’s estoppel only to grounds that
were actually raised during an IPR (i.e., after institution), and declined to
apply petitioner estoppel to any grounds not put forward in the original IPR
petition.
A District of Delaware court was the first to apply Shaw. In
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., patent owner Intellectual
Ventures moved for summary judgment to prevent accused infringer
Toshiba from raising invalidity challenges against a patent previously
challenged by Toshiba in an instituted IPR that resulted in an unsuccessful
FWD.18 Intellectual Ventures argued that invalidity grounds based on
publicly available patents and printed publications not cited in the IPR
petition should be estopped because these references reasonably could have
been raised, i.e., included in the petition.19 While the district court
acknowledged that Intellectual Venture’s argument was “perfectly
plausible” in that “additional obviousness grounds based on public

16. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text; SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu,138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358–59
(2018).
17. SiOnyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., No. 15:13488-FDS, 2018 WL 4177941, at *19
(D. Mass. Aug. 30, 2018).
18. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553–54 (D. Del. 2016).
19. Id. Not all forms of prior art may be asserted in an IPR; only printed publications and prior-art
patents are permitted. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
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documents” could have been raised “at the outset of [the] IPR petition,” the
district court stated that the Federal Circuit construed § 315(e) “quite
literally” in Shaw when it determined that a ground petitioned but not
instituted had not been raised during the IPR (i.e., after institution), and
was thus not estopped.20 Thus, Judge Robinson, in one of her last major
cases before announcing her retirement, begrudgingly denied summary
judgment for Intellectual Ventures because she could not “divine a
reasoned way around the Federal Circuit’s decision in Shaw,” which
required restricting § 315(e) estoppel to grounds raised or raisable during
an IPR (as opposed to raised or raisable in a petition) despite her opinion
that this interpretation “confounds the very purpose” of IPRs. 21 The
shielding of non-petitioned grounds from estoppel resulting from this
reading of Shaw provides significant protection and flexibility for patent
challengers engaged in both IPR and district court proceedings.
Since then, at least two other district courts similarly read Shaw as
preventing the application of estoppel to non-petitioned grounds. In Finjan,
Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, LLC, a Northern District of California court
stated that it would follow the Delaware court’s interpretation of Shaw and
would limit estoppel to the “precise combinations” of unpatentability on
which an IPR was instituted.22 A District of Massachusetts court similarly
considered itself bound by Shaw not to apply estoppel to non-petitioned
grounds despite acknowledging there was “much appeal” in a reading of §
315(e) that would encompass grounds that could have been, but were not,
raised in a prior petition for IPR.23
In district courts reading Shaw this way, patent challengers might thus
benefit from being able to assert any non-petitioned grounds in later district
court proceedings, even if these grounds could have been presented in the
prior IPR petition. Thus, these districts could be disfavored venues for
patent assertors seeking rigorous application of estoppel over prior PTAB
challenges. Were this reading of Shaw to control, it would reduce the
pressure on petitioners to raise all possible patentability grounds when
petitioning for IPR.

20. Intellectual Ventures I, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 553.
21. Id. at 554.
22. Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., LLC, 283 F. Supp. 3d 839, 856 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
23. Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Wangs Alliance. Corp., No. CV 14-12298-DJC, 2018 WL
283893, at *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 2, 2018) (denying summary judgment that invalidity contentions not raised
in the accused infringer’s IPR petition were estopped).

2019

PETITIONER ESTOPPEL FROM PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

15

B. Cases finding estoppel did apply to non-petitioned grounds
In contrast to the strict application of Shaw by some district courts, the
PTAB has broadly applied § 315(e) estoppel to all petitioned and even nonpetitioned grounds, generally applying a flexible standard of “reasonably
could have been raised during the inter partes review” that includes nonpetitioned grounds based on “prior art which a skilled searcher conducting
a diligent search reasonably could have been expected to discover.”24
While this position finds support in the AIA’s legislative history, it appears
to disregard the Federal Circuit’s position in Shaw that § 315(e)’s language
“during [an] inter partes review” refers to the post-institution phase of an
IPR, and thus that estoppel applies only to grounds raised (or reasonably
raisable) during an instituted IPR proceeding (as opposed to in a petition).25
Several district courts have followed this broader reading of Shaw,
allowing for application of estoppel to non-petitioned grounds.
The Western District of Wisconsin provided one of the earliest district
court opinions declining to apply Shaw to all non-petitioned grounds,
finding such grounds estopped. In Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Meyer
Products LLC, after unsuccessfully challenging a patent in an IPR that
resulted in a FWD, the accused infringer, Meyer, raised invalidity
contentions in litigation against the patent owner, Douglas.26 Meyer
asserted all of the grounds and claims it had previously included in its
petition for the IPR (that were then denied institution) as well as new
grounds based on two additional printed publication prior art references.27
In holding that Meyer was estopped from asserting the new grounds
(but not the previously petitioned grounds), the district court reasoned that
“Shaw’s narrow view of § 315(e) estoppel undermines the purported
efficiency of IPR, especially if it were applied to allow post-IPR assertion
of non-petitioned grounds” that reasonably could have been raised.28
Allowing a petitioner to assert new non-petitioned grounds that could
reasonably have been raised would transform an IPR into “an additional

24. See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. Wyeth LLC, No. IPR2015-00873, Paper 8 at 6 (P.T.A.B Sept. 16,
2015) (decision issued pre-Shaw, but outlining standards followed post-Shaw); Praxair Distrib., Inc. v.
INO Therapeutics LLC, No. IPR2016-00781, Paper 10 at 7 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 25, 2016); Great West Cas.
Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. IPR2016-01534, Paper 13 at 11–15 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017).
25. Apotex, No. IPR2015-00873, at 6 (quoting 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Grassley); Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293,
1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
26. Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Meyer Products LLC, No. 14-cv-886-JDP, 2017 WL 1382556, at
*2 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2017).
27. Id.
28. Id. at *4.
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step” of litigating patentability prior to doing so in the district court instead
of an “alternative” and would enable a defendant to “hold a second-string
invalidity case in reserve in case the IPR does not go defendant’s way.”29
Explicitly disagreeing with the Shaw interpretation of “during” and also
suggesting Shaw’s procedural posture was distinguishable, the district court
stated that “until Shaw is limited or reconsidered” it would not apply
estoppel to non-instituted grounds, but would estop “grounds not asserted
in the IPR petition, so long as they are based on prior art that could have
been found by a skilled searcher’s diligent search.”30 The court’s decision
in Douglas thus served as an early example of an accused infringer having
non-petitioned grounds denied later consideration.
Other district courts have similarly concluded that declining to apply
estoppel to some non-petitioned grounds while applying it to grounds
actually raised but denied was counterintuitive, would frustrate the purpose
of AIA reviews, and was not required by Shaw. An Eastern District of
Texas court came to this conclusion in Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
stating that accused infringers are estopped from asserting at trial “grounds
not included in a petition that a ‘skilled searcher conducting a diligent
search reasonably could have been expected to discover.’”31 Several
additional district courts have reached similar conclusions, including the
Eastern District of Virginia,32 the Eastern District of Wisconsin,33 the
Northern District of Illinois,34 and the District of Delaware (albeit with a
judge sitting by designation).35

29. Id.
30. Id. at *5.
31. Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:13-cv-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 2526231, at *7 (E.D.
Tex. May 11, 2017).
32. See Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., No. 2:15cv21, 2017 WL 2605977, at *3 (E.D.
Va. June 5, 2017) (“The Court ADOPTS the narrow reading of Shaw and FINDS that estoppel applies
to grounds that the petitioner raised at the IPR itself and could have raised in the IPR petition or at the
IPR itself. The court in Shaw was only making observations in dicta, and it had no occasion to consider
restricting estoppel in the manner that other districts have interpreted it. Furthermore, the broad reading
of Shaw renders the IPR estoppel provisions essentially meaningless because parties may pursue two
rounds of invalidity arguments as long as they carefully craft their IPR petition. It would waste this
Court’s time to allow a stay for a year during IPR proceedings and then review invalidity arguments
that Defendants could (and perhaps should) have raised in their IPR petition. The Court’s reading of
Shaw gives effect to every word in the statute while also recognizing the effect of the USPTO’s
decision on an IPR petition.”).
33. See Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1031–33 (E.D. Wis.
2017) (applying petitioner’s estoppel to non-petitioned grounds based on references included in IPR or
on references that patent owner demonstrated were readily available through reasonably diligent
search).
34. See Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-CV-1067, 2017 WL 3278915,
at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017) (finding no Federal Circuit guidance directly on point as to whether §
315(e) applies to non-petitioned ground, but concluding that “§ 315(e) applies to nonpetitioned grounds
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A recent decision suggests that this reading of Shaw could be adopted
broadly in view of the SAS holding. In SiOnyx LLC v. Hamamatsu
Photonics K.K., a District of Massachusetts court considered the question
of grounds and claims that reasonably could have been raised in a petition,
but were not, and suggested they should be estopped.36 The court
acknowledged that “[p]rior to SAS, a minority of district courts had held
that only grounds actually raised in the petition could count as grounds that
‘reasonably could have been raised,’” but the court offered that “[a]fter
SAS, that cannot be correct.”37 According to the court, because there will no
longer be such a thing as a petitioned, non-instituted ground in IPRs
leading to FWDs after SAS, the words “reasonably could have raised” in §
315(e) now “must refer to grounds that were not actually in the IPR
petition, but reasonably could have been included” in order for them to
have any meaning at all.38 The court then acknowledged the interpretation
of “reasonably could have raised” as including “any patent or printed
publication that a petitioner actually knew about or that ‘a skilled searcher
conducting a diligent search reasonably could have been expected to
discover’” as having been adopted by several district courts. However, the
court declined to apply estoppel at the summary judgment phase because a
genuine question of fact existed “as to whether a diligent, skilled searcher
would have found” the reference in question.39
Whether SAS indeed resolves the jurisdictional split as to the estoppel
of non-petitioned grounds that reasonably could have been raised in the
petition will be a question for PTAB practitioners to follow closely in the
coming months.
III. DEFINING PETITIONED GROUNDS
If Shaw is read in a manner that exempts non-petitioned grounds from
estoppel, a second question is raised—what defines “petitioned” grounds?
Do subsets or combinations of prior art references relied on in a petition
with respect to patent claims for which the PTAB issued a final written decision” after considering plain
language of statute, opinions of other district courts, purpose of IPRs, fairness, and due process).
35. See Parallel Networks Licensing, LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 13-2072 (KAJ), 2017
WL 1045912, at *11–12 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2017) appeal dismissed, No. 2017-2042, 2017 WL 5897705
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 20, 2017), aff’d, 721 F. App’x 994 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (J. Jordan, Circuit judge sitting by
designation) (applying estoppel to grounds that accused infringer had incorporated as invalidity
contentions and included in expert reports in court proceedings prior to IPR).
36. SiOnyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., No. 15:13488-FDS, 2018 WL 4177941, at *19
(D. Mass. Aug. 30, 2018).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at *19–20.
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count as “petitioned grounds”? Or new grounds? In this way, these can be
seen as “closer cases” for the application of estoppel than grounds based on
different prior art. For example, while the Northern District of California
has declined to apply estoppel to non-petitioned grounds,40 decisions from
this district have treated some subsets of larger combinations of prior art
references included in an instituted IPR challenge as equivalent to the
instituted grounds.41
In Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., a district
court litigation was stayed pending resolution of IPRs requested by the
accused infringer, LG.42 After the PTAB upheld the patentability of one of
the challenged claims in view of two asserted combinations of references,
(using the court’s shorthand) Lindholm in view of Kurihara and Rich in
view of Kurihara, the district court held that LG was also estopped from
asserting invalidity on the basis of Lindholm or Rich as stand-alone
references.43 Thus, even in districts where patent challengers may
ostensibly raise non-petitioned grounds without fear of estoppel, they may
face limitations on what grounds they may raise, with some combination
grounds not expressly detailed in their petition still being considered
“petitioned” if based solely on unasserted combinations or subsets of prior
art found in the petition.
Some courts may treat individual references differently despite
generally estopping subsets of previously asserted references. In Oil-Dri
Corp. of America v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., a court in the Northern
District of Illinois held the accused infringer, Purina, was not estopped
from raising invalidity arguments based on individual prior art references
previously considered in a FWD.44 The court reasoned that obviousness
based on a combination may be rejected by the PTAB based on insufficient
articulation of a motivation to combine.45 The court also considered the
procedural posture, where the PTAB explicitly excluded an analysis of
either prior art reference alone from its decision. 46 Such an approach may
40. See Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., LLC, 283 F. Supp. 3d 839, 856 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
41. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 14-cv-01012-SI, 2017 WL 2774339, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017).
42. Id. at *1.
43. Id. at *6; see also Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:13-cv-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL
2526231, at *8 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017) (recommending that combination of “Kenoyer” and “Briere”
references be estopped because the PTAB instituted and rejected a challenge based on the combination
of the Kenoyer, Briere, and “Hurley” references) (note that Biscotti does not read Shaw as preventing
application of estoppel to non-petitioned grounds).
44. Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-cv-1067, 2017 WL 3278915, at *5–
6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017).
45. Id. at *6.
46. Id.
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provide additional options for patent challengers after an unsuccessful IPR
but may have limited applicability, as the district court also noted that here,
the PTAB had “explicitly considered in its final written decision” whether
the individual references were “properly before it” and concluded that they
were not.47
Subsets of references previously included in petitions may also be
asserted as novel, non-petitioned grounds when raised in combination with
prior art not previously included. In Advanced Micro Devices the patent
owner, Advanced Micro Devices, sought to exclude the Kurihara reference,
included in two combinations considered and rejected by the PTAB, in its
entirety.48 While the district court ruled that LG was barred from asserting
any subsets of previously asserted combinations, it found that IPR estoppel
does not “effect a bar to LG’s assertion of all combinations including [the
reference] . . .”49 Thus, patent challengers may rely on prior art previously
asserted in an IPR, so long as this art is asserted in combination with
additional references, that either could not have been raised previously (in
districts applying estoppel to non-petitioned grounds) or were not raised
previously (in districts declining to apply estoppel to non-petitioned
grounds).
Clearly, the nuances of estoppel after Shaw dictate careful study of the
cases that came both before and after SAS.
IV. PETITIONED GROUNDS INSTITUTED BUT NOT RELIED ON IN THE
FINAL WRITTEN DECISION

In a recent decision contending with the SAS transition, the Federal
Circuit set out, in an aside, a “distinct question”: “whether, after instituting
on the entire petition” the PTAB may issue a FWD in which it “decide[s]
the merits of certain challenges and then find others moot.”50 This remark
alludes to the possibility of some instituted grounds being considered moot
and left “undecided” in a FWD, but being “subject to revival if appellate
review of the decided challenges renders the undecided ones no longer
moot.”51
47. Id. at *5.
48. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 14-cv-01012-SI, 2017 WL 2774339, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017).
49. Id.; see also Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:13-cv-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL
2526231, at *8 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017) (estoppel holding “extends only to subsets of . . . grounds”)
(emphasis in original).
50. PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
51. Id. Practitioners have noted that since the SAS decision, some decisions instituting review have
failed to analyze all claims and all grounds, despite instituting on all claims and grounds. It remains to
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In this situation, there is some potential for disagreement over whether
the undecided grounds would be subject to § 315(e) estoppel. If the PTAB
is permitted to treat some challenges as moot in drafting FWDs that find
the patent unpatentable on other grounds, uncertainty may arise if the
decided grounds are vacated and remanded on appeal without Federal
Circuit comment on the undecided grounds. District courts might then
disagree as to whether a valid FWD exists for the undecided grounds, and
thus whether any estoppel applies. And it is likewise unclear how the
Courts will treat grounds that were instituted but stipulated to by the
parties.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of persisting uncertainty regarding the application of estoppel
to non-petitioned grounds, petitioners can take proactive steps:
• Be deliberate about which claims and grounds to include in a
petition;
• Assert non-printed publication prior art in subsequent non-IPR
proceedings.
A. Be deliberate about which claims and grounds to include in a
petition
Recent PTAB orders in the context of a covered business method and
IPR review suggest that avoiding estoppel does not provide the “good
cause” required to allow a petitioner to withdraw grounds from
consideration after institution.52 Thus, given the post-SAS PTAB Guidance
to institute either all petitioned claims and grounds or none, petitioners
should carefully consider which references are included in a petition. If
litigation is likely to take place in a jurisdiction not applying estoppel to
non-petitioned grounds, it is better to focus on the strongest grounds rather
than load a petition with alternative grounds. For jurisdictions applying
estoppel to non-petitioned grounds (the majority position, and potentially
the consensus position after SAS), consider raising alternative grounds in a
second petition. Under Shaw, these grounds should be shielded from
estoppel if no review is instituted on that second petition. The post-SAS
be seen if such a “gap between the institution analysis and the challenges presented in the petition” will
impact final written decisions and whether some grounds, while instituted, might be considered moot.
Schreiner & Graham, supra note 9.
52. Dish Network Corp. v. Customedia Techs., No. CBM2017-00019, Paper 50 at 2 (P.T.A.B.
May 16, 2018); Instrumentation Lab. Co. v. Hemosonics, LLC, No. IPR2017-00855, Paper 43 at 8
(P.T.A.B. July 11, 2018).
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PTAB Guidance does not require institution on all of the multiple petitions
directed to the same patent just because the ground in another petition
challenging the same patent are instituted.
B. In subsequent non-IPR proceedings, assert non-printed publication
prior art
Non-printed publication prior art (e.g., physical specimens, evidence
of prior sales or public uses) may be particularly valuable invalidity
grounds in proceedings following a FWD. Even when such art is somewhat
connected to printed publications that were, or could have been, raised, in
the IPR, courts have applied a stringent standard against extending estoppel
to such non-printed publication prior art. In Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v.
Snap-On Inc., the accused infringer Snap-On was permitted to rely on
several non-printed publication prior art references (physical specimens
and videos). The court found these references exempt from estoppel
because it was not clear that Snap-On could have been expected to locate
printed publications associated with the physical devices and videos in its
possession.53 In another case, ZitoVault LLC v. International Business
Machines Corporation, the patent owner, ZitoVault, argued that the
accused infringer, IBM, should not be able to “avoid statutory estoppel
simply by relying on a system where all of the teachings of the system also
exist in patents or printed publications because [those patent or printed
publications] reasonably could have been raised during the IPR.” 54 The
district court rejected this argument on the simple basis that systems are
excluded as prior art from IPR proceedings and that arguments attempting
to link systems to printed publication have consistently failed.55 Other
district courts have come to similar conclusions.56

53. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1032–33 (E.D. Wis. 2017).
54. ZitoVault LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 3:16-cv-0962-M, 2018 WL 2971178, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2018).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Depomed, Inc. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CV 13-571 (MLC), 2016 WL 8677317,
at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2016) (on-sale bar and § 102(g) defenses not estopped because they could not
have been raised during IPRs due to scope limit of IPRs to § 102 and § 103 grounds based on printed
publications); Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. Kemper Corp., No. 6:16-CV-0081, 2016 WL 7634422, at
*3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2016) (discussing scope of statutory estoppel in context of whether IPR will
simplify issues before the court and noting that “defendants have considerable latitude in using prior art
systems (for example, software) embodying the same patents or printed publications placed before the
USPTO in IPR proceedings.”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
By changing how the PTAB institutes AIA petitions, the Supreme
Court’s decision in SAS should eliminate aspects of the post-Shaw
uncertainty regarding the scope of petitioner’s estoppel and may even
resolve some of the most significant disagreements between district courts’
applications of Shaw as to whether non-petitioned grounds are subject to
estoppel. Still, until more district courts take up this question, or until the
Federal Circuit revisits Shaw in light of SAS, uncertainty regarding the
estoppel effects of AIA reviews remains. Careful consideration should be
given to estoppel effects when crafting petitions and selecting prior art to
be asserted.

